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Abstract—The concept of Aadhaar came with the need for
a unique identity for every individual. To implement this, the
Indian government created the authority UIDAI to distribute
and generate user identities for every individual based on their
demographic and biometric data. After the implementation,
came the security issues and challenges of Aadhaar and its
authentication. So, our study focuses on the journey of Aadhaar
from its history to the current condition. The paper also describes
the authentication process, and the updates happened over time.
We have also provided an analysis of the security attacks
witnessed so far as well as the possible countermeasure and its
classification. Our main aim is to cover all the security aspects
related to Aadhaar to avoid possible security attacks. Also, we
have included the current updates and news related to Aadhaar.
Index Terms—Aadhaar, UID, UIDAI, CIDR, KYC, AUA,
PID, POS, Biometrics, Security, Identity, Authentication, Access
Control.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the name suggests, Aadhaar is the base of ones identity
in India. To provide a means of identifying an individual,
the government of India has established UIDAI (Unique
Identification Authority of India) in 2009 under the Ministry
of Electronics and Information Technology, following the
provisions of Aadhaar Act 2016, to collect and manage the
information of all the Indian citizens. Aadhaar consists of
a 12-digit unique number based on the users biometric and
demographic data. The timeline of Aadhaar evolution is shown
in Figure 1.
Before the introduction of Aadhaar, the citizen identification
in India was performed using passports, PAN cards, etc. but
only a very few people have such cards and the more widely
held identity cards such as ration card, NREGA cards, and
voter ID cards had limited utility because of less portability
and easy availability of fraudulent and spoofed cards, etc.
This had created a lack of inclusion of such cards for identity
verification in the country. After realizing the need for a unique
trusted identity proof for every individual in the country, the
government of India created Unique Identification Authority
of India (UIDAI) to generate the Unique ID for everyone in
the form of UID (Unique ID) linked with the iris scan and
fingerprint as well as the demographic data of that individual.
The card generated via UIDAI then got named as Aadhaar
Fig. 1. Aadhaar Timeline
card. The word ”Aadhaar” is a Hindi word that refers to a
’base’ that verifies your identity.
A. Aadhaar Features
There are various features of Aadhaar, which makes it a true
and unique digital identity. Since the inclusion of Aadhaar has
created a centralized system to manage the entire population,
many services that require authentication are now possible
with the use of Aadhaar card instead of using Proof of Address
and Proof of Identity separately. There are mainly five features
of Aadhaar, which makes it more advantageous [17].
1) Distinctive: Biometric and demographic de-duplication
provide the uniqueness of Aadhaar. Once a user has
registered with his/her details with the biometric infor-
mation, it will be stored in the UIDAI database. And if
the resident enrolls again, he/she will be rejected as the
data is already available and match exactly with the one
present in the records. This makes Aadhaar a distinctive
identity for every individual.
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2) Availability: Since the Aadhaar authentication is avail-
able anywhere in India through online services. It gives a
nationwide portability benefit. This is important as many
people shifts from one place to another, which will not
require the registration again.
3) Random Nature: The Aadhaar numbers are generated
randomly. A person who wishes to enroll must provide
demographic data along with biometric information. It
doesnt require details about ones caste, religion, income,
health, etc.
4) Centrally managed Architecture: The architecture of
UID is scalable, which implies that the data is managed
centrally and can be updated/created or authenticated
from anywhere in the country. It is capable of handling
100 million authentications per day. [17]
5) Technologies: It uses open-source technologies, making
it independent of specific computer hardware, storage,
OS, database vendor, or any specific technology to scale.
Since Aadhaar requires scalability the most, this feature
will cater to it.
B. Aadhaar Benefits and Applications
There are several benefits of Aadhaar, which makes it more
viable to use. Aadhaar has now been used in many services,
which requires authentication. The first benefit of Aadhaar is
that it provides identities to all individuals irrespective of their
caste, religion, income, or race. Since the registration requires
the demographic data linked with the biometrics, there are
fewer chances of fake identities and duplicates. Secondly, it
enables financial inclusion and electronic transfer of benefits.
Earlier, the people living in remote areas were neglected
and were un-informed of the services available, or even if
they knew, they were unable to use these services because
of inadequate documents and details. With the presence of
Aadhaar, they will also be identified and can avail services
such as banking, loan, funds, sim-cards, etc. It also enhances
the security of transactions by adding a level of security that
requires authentication. This addition creates a governmental
aspect between the transaction, which plays a safeguarding
role in the eyes of individuals. All these benefits can be
employed by making use of the applications, which require
Aadhaar and its authentication services. Following are the top
10 Aadhaar applications [4]:
1) Acquisition of Passport
2) Opening Bank Accounts
3) Digital Life Certificate
4) Jan Dhan Yojana
5) Disbursing Provident fund
6) LPG subsidy
7) Railway Reservation
8) ATM security
9) E-voting System
10) Aadhaar e-KYC services
This paper focuses on the authentication process and the
security threats in Aadhaar. To cover that, the entire document
is divided into seven sections. Section I describes the usage
of Aadhaar, its features, benefits, and applications, followed
by related work in Section II. Section III covers the Aadhaar
authentication in detail. It talks about the Aadhaar model,
the flow of Aadhaar, the analysis of UIDAI measures, the
protection of user data, and possible measures against insider
attacks. Section IV discusses the Aadhaar security and the
potential security breaches and also explains the actual inci-
dents that happened over the last two years. Section V presents
the latest updates on Aadhaar taken from several accessible
media sources. Section VI provides the conclusion of the entire
study and the upcoming technologies such as Virtual IDs and
Aadhaar coins. The last section covers the acknowledgment,
followed by references.
II. RELATED WORK
We did a literature survey to analyze the entire Aadhaar
authentication process and its issues and challenges.
In 2011, Vikas Sharma (ICDEOL) [1] had presented the
study on the benefits and challenges of Aadhaars invention.
According to the author, Aadhaar has proven to be a potential
benefit for underprivileged people who had to struggle to
verify their identity at every level to get the benefits from
government schemes and access the public distribution sys-
tem. The study showcases the ’Aadhaar-Unique Identification
Model’ along with the technological architecture of the unique
identification system. The main challenge is the Implemen-
tation of the Aadhaar-UID System, which has been well
pointed out by the author. The authors concluded that for the
success of the Aadhaar project, it requires strong coordination
between state governments and UIDAI at the top level and
good communication between registrars and other intermediate
agencies at the bottom level, for a good quality data enrolment
and authentication.
To further understand the need for Aadhaar, we referred
to the report written by Chakrabarty et al. [3] in 2012. This
document discusses how Aadhaar as a project was proposed in
2006 for Unique ID for Below Poverty Line (BPL) families.
The prime aim of the unique ID was to provide the financially
excluded ones with the services and the primary identity. This
report talks about how UID verifies and authenticates Aadhaar
in an online and cost-effective manner and how it can become
an initial linkage for widespread financial inclusion in the
country. The author then discussed the various advantages of
UID in financial inclusions like Linking the UID number to
a universal, accessible, and affordable micro-payment model
that can transform the access the poor people have to bank
services in the country, thus empowering every individual in
India.
Since our research area is Aadhaar Authentication as well
as security, so we reviewed the papers written by other
authors in this domain. For authentication, we referred to
the Aadhaar Authentication API Specification released by
UIDAI. The report [8], [9], [10], [11] describes the process of
Aadhaar authentication wherein Aadhaar number, along with
other attributes, are submitted to the Central Identities Data
Repository (CIDR) for its verification. The Unique Identifi-
cation Authority of India (UIDAI) provides an online service
to support this process. Aadhaar authentication service only
responds with a yes/no, and it does not return any personally
identifiable information as a part of the response. Further,
it explains the multiple factors that are used for Aadhaar
authentication, including biometric data, demographic data,
OTP, PIN, possession of mobile, or combinations thereof
and how the strength of authentication increases by adding
multiple factors was discussed. The conclusion of the report
states that the Aadhaar authentication provides a convenient
or easy mechanism for all Aadhaar holders to establish their
identity. It provides a platform for identity authentication and
can be used to deliver services effectively to Aadhaar holders
across the country. The report listed the changes in version
[11] from version [8].
The second aspect covered in our study focuses on the
security issues on the Aadhaar system. For that, we referred
to several research papers to understand the privacy and other
security issues of the Aadhaar system. In 2017 Singh et
al. [2] have presented a review paper on Aadhaar card, its
applications, and case studies related to data privacy and
information loss. It further discusses the scope of Aadhaar
and the benefits of linking Aadhaar card to various systems to
avail of the services. To review these aspects of Aadhaar, the
authors have presented their analysis based on several research
articles, reports from leading newspapers, and Supreme Court
verdicts. According to the findings in this paper, Aadhaar
is one of the most noteworthy innovations towards digital
transformation, which aids the citizens to use Aadhaar card
as an identity in various areas such as railways, voting, PDS
(public Distribution Systems), National Pension Scheme, etc.
This paper highlights cases which require the initiative to
solve security and privacy-related issues. The authors have also
covered the Supreme Court observations on various Aadhaar
issues, followed by a discourse on the ambiguities in the
current system.
Further, to understand the applications of Aadhaar in India,
we reviewed the paper by Raja et al. [4] written in 2017.
This paper presents a brief review of the Aadhaar card and
discusses the scope and advantages of linking Aadhaar card
to various systems (such as railways, health care, etc.). They
also presented multiple cases in which Aadhaar card may pose
security threats and harm the system.
The launch of the Aadhaar project was centered on the inter-
operability of varied e-governance functionalities to confirm
the optimum utilization of data, Communication, and Tech-
nology Infrastructure.
In India, some of the Data Privacy and Protection laws are
somewhat included under the sections of IT Act (2008), and
many are yet to be implemented and are under consideration.
In the Aadhaar Act, some issues need to be understood. The
paper also covers some issues with Aadhaar such as :
• Aadhaar is not a unique identity card; its simply a
number. It does not contain any security features like PAN
card, and Voter ID does.
• Aadhaar is used as proof of address. UIDAI does not
even verify the address of the candidates. Still, Aadhaar
has been accepted as a signal of address in the banking
sector and telecommunication corporations.
In 2015, Agrawal et al. [5] looked into the possibilities
of authentication using Aadhaar number, and its a database
and proposed some ways to protect it. Being a single global
identifier, Aadhaar is prone to privacy breaches and thus
requires an alteration in design to make it safe. To know what
is required for an individual application, a detailed analysis of
the use case is needed. From a technical point of view, what
they suggested: to get into several modern tools and techniques
to make it up to date and provide a shield against run-time
attacks. Moreover, they suggested an independent third party
that can act as an auditor and keeper of the cryptographic keys
used for encryption and decryption of data and transaction
logs stored in the UIDAI systems. Insider attacks or leaks are
the most significant threats. Under the administrative control
of a third-party auditor, such malicious insider leaks can be
prevented. Lastly, a robust policy framework to address the
legal issues related to identification and authentication in a
digital world was proposed. Security should be maintained on
both the client-side and server-side to secure the database. The
authors have suggested solutions to the existing attacks.
In 2017, A.K.R.S.Anusha and Dr. G. Rajkumar [6] studied
and verified the purpose, benefits, and the privacy and security
issues faced during collection, storage, and transmission of
Aadhaar details. The paper started with the description of
Aadhaar’s benefits and usage followed by the Privacy and
Security Issues in the Aadhaar Life Cycle. This includes
Vulnerabilities in Biometric Capture Devices, Private Players
and Data Leakage, Cryptographic Algorithms, etc. The paper
also discusses several active and passive attacks that may be
targeted on the CIDR database. Further, it describes the laws
and legislation related to these attacks. But the paper does not
contain the possible solution to the problem.
Another research work done by Arpana et al. [7] in 2016
presented a study on Security Algorithms for Privacy Pro-
tection and Security in Aadhaar. The paper discusses various
security measures that can be implemented to protect Aadhaar
from insider attacks. In the Hadoop environment, the key
requirements are authentication, authorization, data encryp-
tion, and security against various attacks. A new encryption
technique to secure data in the HDFS environment is the
combination of AES and Map Reduce.It performs encryption
in parallel using AES-MR an Advanced Encryption standard
based encryption using Map Reduce. To provide network
security Quantum Cryptography and Biometric based Security
solutions using BB84 protocol were suggested. The authors
also explained the various proposed algorithms and security
measure to implement on the Network level security Layer,
Database level Security Layer and Application Level security
Layer.
A summary of the literature has been drafted out in Table
I.
TABLE I
RELATED WORKS
References Proposed Findings Limitations
Vikas Sharma(ICDEOL), 2011 [1] Study on the benets and challenges
of Aadhaars invention.
Aadhaar, along with the benets,
faces a huge challenge, such as the
Implementation of Aadhaar-UID
System.
Implementation of the
Aadhaar-UID System.
Singh et al. 2017 [2] Aadhaar card, its applications, and
case studies related to data privacy
and information loss.
Scope of Aadhaar and the benets
of linking Aadhaar card to various
systems to avail of the services.
Solutions to solve security and
privacy-related issues.
Chakrabarty et al. 2012 [3] How Aadhaar as a project was
proposed in 2006 for Unique ID
for Below Poverty Line (BPL)
families.
The various advantages of UID in
nancial inclusions.
Ways to authenticate yourself as an
actual Aadhaar user.
Raja et al. 2017 [4] Aadhaar card, and discusses the
scope and advantages of linking
Aadhaar card to various systems.
The launch of this project was
focused on the interoperability of
various e-governance
functionalities to ensure the
optimal utilization of Information,
Communication, and Technology
Infrastructure.
Ways to remove loopholes in the
existing system.
Agrawal et al. 2015 [5] Looked into the possibilities of
authentication using Aadhaar
number, and it’s a database and
suggested some ways to protect it.
Insider attacks or leaks are the
biggest threats. An independent
third party that can act as an
auditor to prevent malicious insider
leaks
Under a third-party auditor, a
solution to the minimization of
attacks and leaks.
A.K.R.S.Anusha and Dr. G.
Rajkumar 2017 [6]
Studied and veried the purpose,
benets, and the privacy and
security issues faced during
collection, storage, and
transmission of Aadhaar details.
Description of Aadhaar benets and
usage followed by the Privacy and
Security Issues in the Aadhaar Life
Cycle.
Solutions about several active and
passive attacks that may be
targeted on the CIDR database.
III. AADHAAR AUTHENTICATION
Aadhaar authentication is the process wherein Aadhaar
number with other attributes, which also include demographic
data, biometrics, or a combination thereof, are submitted
to the CIDR (Central Identities Data Repository ) for its
verification. To understand the elements involved in Aadhaar
Authentication in detail, refer to the official website of UIDAI
[17].
A. The Flow of Aadhaar Model:
Usage of open data format in XML and widely used
stateless service such as HTTPS allows easy adoption and
deployment of Aadhaar authentication.Following is the URL
format that was used for Aadhaar authentication service:
https://auth.uidai.gov.in/2.5/public/uid[0]/uid[1]/asalk
• uid[0] and uid[1] are first 2 digits of Aadhaar Number
when UID is used.
• asalk is a valid ASA license key which is received when
device is registered successfully and it ensures that above
mentioned URL is encoded to handle special characters.
The following are the key factors in Aadhaar authentication
[17]. The Figure 2 explains the Aadhaar flow model.
1) Aadhaar number holder provides Aadhaar Number and
a biometric detail which is unique to every person. The
biometric detail was captured using a STQC certified and
high-quality USB fingerprint scanner - MFS100.
• A data element ”Bio” in PID XML contains an en-
crypted FMR(Fingerprint Image Record) in the case of
registered devices.The FMR data is a fingerprint image
packaged in ISO 19794-4 format, which could contain
a lossy compressed image of type jpeg2000.
• Our application passes ”UNKNOWN” in the posh
attribute of the ”Bio” data element in PID XML, as
Aadhaar number holder can provide any random finger
as their fingerprint.
2) Aadhaar authentication enabled application software in-
stalled on the device, calls the registered Device service to
obtain PID, which is a base-64 encoded encrypted block.
3) AUA application sends the encrypted PID block along
with HMAC, Session key, Device attributes, etc. data
to AUA server over mobile/broadband network using a
standard and a secure protocol - HTTPS to support an end
to end security and avoid request tampering and man-in-
the-middle-attacks. This process includes the following
steps:
• After forming PID XML, the SHA-256 hash of PID
XML was computed and then it was encrypted with
a dynamic session key using the AES-256 symmetric
algorithm.
• Session key, in turn, was encrypted with 2048-
bit UIDAI public key using an asymmetric algo-
rithm(RSA). The session key was not stored anywhere
except in memory and was used exactly once for every
transaction.
• The encryption was done at the time of capture on the
client and encoding(base-64) was done on the device
which ensures no outsider to snoop and leak the data.
Fig. 2. Aadhaar flow model
4) AUA server forms the final authentication XML input
for API after validation, adds necessary headers(AUA
specific wrapper XML with license key, digitally signs
the XML for message integrity and non-repudiation pur-
poses) and passes the request through ASA server to
UIDAI CIDR.
• Digital certificate of class II, and the private key was
used for digital signing.
• XML digital signature algorithm was used as recom-
mended by W3C.
5) Aadhaar authentication server validates the input, de-
crypts data, validates decrypted data, does the matching,
creates audit, and responds with a ”yes/no” as part of
the digitally signed response XML. If validation fails for
some of the inputs in our application, then the following
error was returned as a response:
• ”300” : Biometric data did not match.
• ”500” : Invalid encryption of session key.
• ”502” : Invalid encryption of PID.
• ”503” : Invalid encryption of Hmac.
• ”540” : Invalid Auth XML version.
• ”541” : Invalid PID XML version.
Other authentication errors, can be found at [11].
6) Based on the response from the Aadhaar authentication
server, AUA conducts the transaction.
Aadhaar system records all the authentication requests and
their corresponding responses for audit purposes. UIDAI and
AUA’s digitally signs these authentication responses to validate
the response integrity. In addition, few other attributes ”ts”,
”info” within the API response are used to verify that the
request was for legitimate Aadhaar user, if the request was
having biometric factor when authentication was being done.
Such self- verifiability of the response allows to trust third
party applications.
B. Aadhaar’s privacy concerns
The major concern about the Aadhaar scheme is the Aad-
haar number. As it is a single unique identifier that must
function across multiple domains, and hence it becomes not
only electronically but publicly available but also in human-
readable forms as well. This may lead to multiple breaches in
privacy. The possible breach of privacy where an individual
can be compromised in a setting such as in Aadhaar are as
follows:
1) Identification without consent using UID: tracking of
Aadhaar ID is done without the consent of respective
identity, which may break authentication and confiden-
tiality of the user.
2) Identification without consent using biometric data:
Aadhaar data can be illegally used to identify people with
unauthorized use of biometrics such as fingerprint, iris
scan, or facial photographs.
3) Illegal tracking of individuals: records of an Aadhaar
user with precise location, time, and context can be
tracked down.
The above attacks are much likely if the attacker can collude
with the insider with access to various components of the
Aadhaar System.
C. Recommendation of UIDAI:
The UIDAI recommends that the AUAs should maintain
the mapping between their domain-specific identifiers and the
global Aadhaar number at their back-end. But UIDAI assumes
that there cannot be any breach of privacy and thus does not
maintain such mapping.
In the current scenario, the scheme requires the Aadhaar
authentication in which the user needs to provide the Aadhaar
number as a public identifier. Due to such weak provisions,
identification without consent and correlation of identities
remain as real possibilities. To solve the above-stated problem,
[5] suggested providing different local Aadhaar numbers for
the different domains under one master identity embedded in a
strong cryptographic method. This may prevent the connection
among the domains if at all possible by allowing limited
linkages across domain,uni-bidirectionally, or bidirectionally.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF VERSIONS
Version 1.5 [8] Version 1.6 [9] Version 2.0 [10] Vversion 2.5 [11]
Meta element was inside PID block Meta element outside PID block New (2.0) Aadhaar holder consent
for authentication
Incorporated BFD feature into core
authentication
Meta element was optional Meta element and attributes made
mandatory.
Structure changed to accommodate
geo-location, public IP address.
Meta part has many additional
attributes to support registered
devices
Usage of VID and UID token
incorporated
Session is sent always. Session key is synchronized with
the allowance of advanced use
case.
SSK scheme removed with
introduction to registered devices.
Session key must not be stored
anywhere except in memory and
should not be reused across
transactions.
Txn attribute , optional Txn attribute made mandatory for
better working of system
Info attribute of the response
enhanced from version 2.0 to 3.0
Info attribute version changed to
4.0 from 3.0
PID block is always XML. Additional support for binary
Protobuf format.
PID (Personal Identity Data)
session key encryption changed to
AES/GCM.
Data element contains Pid element
which is a base-64 encoded
encrypted block.
D. Comparison of Versions
Indias Aadhaar project has increasing users and is getting
more secured with every new version. So we have compared
the four versions, mainly 1.5, 1.6, 2.0, and 2.5. Refer Table
II for the comparison as mentioned above.
IV. AADHAAR SECURITY
The Aadhaar can be successful only if its implementation
and use are secure at every step. For the safe use of this
identity, UIDAI uses a well-protected authentication scheme.
From the collection process to authentication, there exist many
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers. To identify
every individual uniquely, UIDAI has provided Biometric
means to store the data corresponding to each user. The
Biometric signature is used for an identity as well as the
authentication process. But there are few requirements for
biometric to work properly. It includes face, fingerprint, and
Iris scan, which requires proper orientation and light for face
detection, good quality of fingerprint. The use of contact
lenses or spectacles can hinder the Iris authentication process.
Also, there is a possibility of false positives in biometric
authentication in a population of 1.3 billion, which requires
a unique identity for everyone. Biometric security is the main
concern to make the Aadhaar system secure. As referred
from [12], some security vulnerabilities in Aadhaar Biometric
System includes:
1) Fake biometrics: The attacker can create fake finger-
prints, face, or IRIS images to steal the user’s identity,
and once they get the identity, the user cannot re-generate
the genuine identity for themselves.
2) Backdoor Planting: Instead of attacking every time, the
attacker can plant a backdoor for next time. For e.g.,
circumventing the device by injecting a recorded image
within the system input is much easier than attacking the
device.
3) Identity Stealing: Once a user gets access to the storage,
he can overwrite the legitimate users model/template with
his/her own - in essence, stealing their identity.
4) Modification of Template: To get a high verification
score, no matter which image is conferred to the system,
the feature sets, on verification, or in the templates can
be modified.
5) Script to increase the verification score:The attacker
can put a Trojan horse program to some elements of
the system, such as a matcher that always generates high
verification scores.
User acceptance is another problem with Biometric Authenti-
cation since people dont find sharing their personal informa-
tion as a convenient mode for interacting with the government.
A. Security Challenges in a CIDR
The complete detail of the residents is stored in the UIDAI
database - CIDR at a single location, which again can become
a breeding ground for attacks. So protecting the central reposi-
tory is a big challenge. The possible threats to the UID system
are :
1) Unauthorized writing: If there arent any proper security
measures then, the unauthorized user can write the files
present in the database with malicious content.
2) Data Sniffing: This kind of threat occurs when someone
intercepts the communication between CIDR and Regis-
trar system and reads the data by sniffing data packets
traveling in the channel.
3) Redirection to Fake server:The normal user can be redi-
rected to a fake server through phishing. This constitutes
a privacy threat because the fake server can then access
the users information.
4) Physical Breach: With the absence of physical security,
the attacker can steal private keys to access the private
data, which can be done by rewiring a circuit on the chip
or using the probing pins to monitor data flows.
5) Cryptological attacks: These attacks break the confi-
dentiality of data transmitted as it directly targets the
encryption algorithm.
Even though the CIDR system has been established by taking
all the possible security measures, the intermediate agencies
and registrars which capture and store the same data can
become a weak link to be exploited.
B. Security Challenges during Collection Phase
The data collection process involves the registrar who
aggregates enrollment from intermediate agencies and sub-
registrars and forwards it to CIDR. The security challenges
here involves:
1) Compromization of account: The admin can share its
account to third parties, or it can be phished or attacked
by viruses.
2) Insider Attack: The enrolling registrars and agents can
plant an insider attack for the sake of extra money or any
kind of grudges with the government.
3) Insecure Communication Channel: The details when
entered through the application by sub-registrars, it is
saved to the local database of and then get transferred
to the registrar for submission to CIDR. If there is no
secure channel present during this phase, the data can be
altered or captured through the channel itself.
4) Outdated Software’s: The software used by the inter-
mediate agencies who gather the details of users can be
out of date, which poses a security vulnerability and can
be exploited by malicious users.
So, the collection process involves many security challenges,
which can be avoided by secure communication between all
the intermediate parties and the central repository CIDR.
C. Security Challenges during transmission Phase
After collecting information from the citizens, the next
step is the validation of the details with the central database
for de-duplication. This requires each intermediate agency
to communicate with CIDR. Assuming that there will be a
common application for every registrar office to communicate
with each other, the transmission process attracts the maximum
number of attackers. These include:
1) Man in the middle attack: In this case an attacker
gathers information and alter data and relay it.
2) Black hole attack: A remote node acts as an intermediate
node between two nodes, and packets are passed through
this node. But this node makes all the packets disappear.
3) Bogus registration attack: When someone registers
himself with a bogus server and mask himself as genuine
and gather all information.
4) Snooping: This is similar to eavesdropping, but it only
includes the usual observance of data flow.
5) Blackmail: It happens due to a lack of authenticity. It
grants allowance to any node to corrupt data or informa-
tion of other nodes.
UIDAI must build multi-factor authentication to build a secure
application and also need to take care of session timeouts.
UIDAI must also have enough provisions to secure the end-
point of the transactional layer.
D. Security Challenges during Storage Phase
The Aadhaar data of 1.3 billion people, even if collected and
transmitted by avoiding the possible threats, need to be stored
securely, which requires a large size database. It is a huge
challenge for the authorities to manage the security of such
large sensitive information, which is segregated over various
touchpoints across the country. The possible threats to storage
are:
1) Destructive Attacks: There are many varieties of worms,
viruses bots that can be used to attack the database to
gather data, alter, delete data.
2) Incautious Behavior: The administrator can cause errors
such as leaving the system unlocked, trip over wires, etc.
which gives a loophole for an attacker to attack.
3) Infrastructural Error: Server failure, systems with no
physical security can also leave loopholes for attackers
to get access to the database.
4) Original/Raw data: The original data can easily be
accessed as well as exploited, which can become a threat
to the Aadhaar system. So data should always be kept in
an encrypted or hashed form in the database.
5) Lack of proper access control mechanism: Proper
access rights are required to be given following the
principle of least privilege and separation of duties. IT
should implement regular control over the applications.
And even when data is shared with other sources should
be able to maintain confidentiality to avoid leakage.
These were the possible security challenges in the Aadhaar
system mentioned in several sources, such as the DSCI report.
V. SECURITY BREACHES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES
The Aadhaar ecosystem relies on three layers physical,data
link and application layer. The user data used for Aadhaar
enrollment is strongly encrypted with 2048 bit PKI which
ensures secure transmission. However, infrastructure could
be owned by third party agencies. Similarly, the application
layer might be managed by non-UIDAI entities. While UIDAI
requires for all contracting parties to put appropriate network
security in place to ensure that their systems are protected from
attack but, it is impossible to ensure systems-wide compliance.
At the application layer, there is no nation-wide encryption
policy to regulate data security.These applications doesn’t
ensure end-to-end encryption for user’s personal information.
It will become easier for an attacker to profile the user
behaviour, if more number of such applications will link
together Aadhaar numbers and user’s personal information(in
unencrypted form). This profile generation can be used against
user to exploit them. In our research, we have found out
several security breaches that happened in the country which
have been reported in various publications and reports. The
growth of the country with the digital transformation brings
the possibilities of cyber attacks as well. We have collected
some security incidents that happened in India (2017-18) and
classified them in each cyber attack category, as mentioned
above in Table III.
TABLE III
SECURITY BREACHES AND CLASSIFICATIONS
Date Breach Security Measures Security Classification
18 Feb 2017 The biometric information of some customers was
used to activate additional SIM cards for other users
by Reliance Jio employees in Madhya Pradesh. [18]
Only trusted people should be kept for verification.
OTP based authentication must be enabled for is-
suance of SIM cards along with the biometric infor-
mation of the user.
Espionage, Forgery, De-
ception, Malicious Third
Party
22 Feb 2017 Third-party website leaked personal information
which includes Aadhaar number, name, parents,
gender, caste, signature and photo of 5-6 lakhs
children. [18]
A proper access control mechanism should be main-
tained.Data should be stored in encrypted form.
Pseudonymization of data before storage.
Data Leakage.
24 Feb 2017 Stored biometric information re-used for testing of
authentication between January 11 to 17, 2017 by
Axis Bank, Suvidhaa Infoserve, and eMadhura. [18]
Strong multi-factor authentication must be imple-
mented.
Espionage, Misuse of
Information, Malicious
Third Party.
25 Feb 2017 Aadhaar numbers and cards were being sold for less
than the price of a cup of tea, with bulk purchases
being even cheaper by data brokers. [18]
Proper access control mechanism. Data at rest
should be kept encrypted so that no one can read
it even if the data gets leaked.
Data Leakage, Misuse of
Aadhaar
30 Mar, 24
April 2017
Aadhaar numbers were leaked by Swachh Bharat
Mission, Ministry of Water and Sanitation (Central
Govt.) [18]
Proper access control.Masking of data and only
revealing the last 4-5 digits.
Third Party Leakage
22 Apr, 23
April 2017
As a result of a programming error, Jharkhand
Directorate of Social Security leaked the names,
addresses, Aadhaar the number and bank account
details of beneficiaries of 1.6 million pensioners.
[18]
Version control should be done. Until the new ver-
sion is made fully secured, the old version should be
used.Once a new version securely starts performing,
it should be brought to use. The new version should
pass all security checks.
Insecure coding, Lack of
proper testing
20 Apr
2017
Without any form of authentication, Kerala SC/ST
scholarship website leaked students information in-
cluding their Aadhaar number, bank account num-
ber, and more. [18]
Proper access control mechanism.Pseudonymization
of data. Implementation of Account lockout policy
Data Leakage,
Malicious Insider
25 Apr
2017
Leakage of Aadhaar Number and a Photo along with
Name, Fathers Name, Gender, Age, Religion, Caste,
City, and State by Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna Site.
[18]
VAPT for all the third party websites using Aadhaar
Data.
Data Leakage,
Malicious Insider.
29 Apr
2017
Leakage of various beneficiary details including
name, ration card number, aadhaar card number, and
more by Andhra Pradesh State Housing Corporation.
[18]
Pseudonymization of data.Proper Detect and Re-
spond Mechanism in the websites
Data Leakage,
Malicious Third Party,
Malicious Insider.
30 Apr
2017
Research scholars data was leaked by Kerala uni-
versity. [18]
Pseudonymization of data.Implementation of SSL
on the govt. websites using Aadhaar Data. (https
websites)
Third Party Leakage
1 May 2017 1,59,42,083 Aadhaar numbers were found leaked by
National Social Pension Programmer. [18]
Pseudonymization of data. Support for remote ad-
ministration and logging features. Creation of least-
Privilege users and groups
Third Party Leakage
25 Sept
2017
Aadhaar database illegally accessed by an IIT grad-
uate via an app Aadhaar eKYC by hacking into the
server of an e-Hospital system. The eKYC routed
all the requests through those servers. [19]
Third parties must have restricted access to data.
Must enforce stronger API access control and In-
trusion detection mechanisms. Regular Assessment
of Security controls to prevent any attack on the e-
hospital system.
Phishing
4 Jan 2018 The Tribune published a report - Rachna Khaira,
a reporter of newspaper, purchased, for Rs500, a
login ID and password that enabled her to access
the database managed by UIDAI [15]
Aadhaar data should be kept encrypted.Proper
checking of logs so that no foreign access is
there.proper intrusion detection systems in place to
deter any anomalous behavior. Rate Limiting
Social Engineering
5 Jan 2018 Money was fraudulently withdrawn using cus-
tomers’ Aadhaar numbers from bank accounts re-
ported by The Indian Express. [14]
Implementation of Multi-factor Authentication.
Training for the individuals in bank dealing at the
user end.
Identity theft and Online
Fraud
24 Mar
2018
Data leak due to unsecured API endpoint informed
by ZDNet [20]
Better threat modeling before software and API re-
leases.Rate Limiting on the API use. Implementation
of a specific policy for securing Aadhaar Data.
Insecure Coding.
31 Mar
2018
Bank accounts opened using fake Aadhaar cards,
for export-import business as reported by Hindustan
times. [22]
Proper access control mechanism. Data at rest
should be kept encrypted so that no one can read
it even if the data gets leaked.
Data Leakage, Misuse of
Aadhaar
30 April
2018
Andhra Pradesh government website leaked aadhaar
data of 70 lakh children. [23]
None None
1 February
2019
Jharkhand Government online system leaked Aad-
haar numbers along with the other personal details
of thousands of workers. [24]
None None
19 February
2019
Indane Gas website leaked millions of Aadhaar
numbers, since part of website was indexed in
Google, allowed anyone to bypass the login and gain
access to the database. [25]
None None
15 April
2019
Telugu Desam Party (TDP) hired IT company to
develop Seva Mitra app, found to apparently store
Aadhaar details of 7.82 crore users from Andhra
Pradesh and Telangana. [26]
None None
20 Septem-
ber 2019
The sensitive data like PAN card, Aadhaar and
income tax details was leaked by Gujrat real estate
authority website due to one of it’s unprotected
download URL. [27]
None None
A. Preventive measures for Security Attacks
Aadhaar from being a random number which doesn’t re-
veal anything about an individual data to other features like
fingerprints, iris scan, address etc should be prevented from
an intruder. To counter above mentioned strategic threats, we
outline various preventive measures:
1) Use of secured communication channel: VPN prefer-
ably SSL-VPN or the MPLS clouds can be deployed due
to high sensitivity of the data during transmission phase.
2) Enabling HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security):The
Man-in-middle agent makes user believe that an HTTPS
connection is not available and that HTTP must be
used. If user is not careful, then the connection with
UIDAI servers will be in an un-encrypted form causing
SSL stripping. If HSTS will be enabled before making
connection request to CIDR/UIDAI servers then it will
enforce HTTPS connection and will protect user against
SSL stripping.
3) Secure testing of aadhaar enabled biometric applica-
tions:The biometric template must not be stored , which
allows user verification as it can lead to substitution attack
where an attacker can overwrite legitimate user’s template
with it’s own. Biometric Encryption can be implemented
that securely binds a cryptographic key to a biometric,
so that neither the key nor the biometric can be retrieved
from the stored template. The key is recreated only if the
correct live biometric sample is presented on verification.
4) Isolating Black Hole Attacks:Black-hole attacks exists
on network layer where black-hole node aims to fool
every node in the network that wants to communicate
with another node by pretending that it always has the
best path to the destination node. AODV integrated with a
lightweight technique that uses timers and baiting can be
used to isolate single and cooperative black hole attacks,
preventing information to reach intruder.
5) Preventing insider attacks: Within the UIDAI, the trans-
action logs are stored in encrypted form along with their
decryption keys. The keys might be tampered and can
be illegally accessed by recomputing HMAC without
informing the database administrator. This is an insider
attack which can be solved by an independent third party
agency, being a keeper of cryptographic keys.
6) Hashing biometric data: A sensitive information like
biometric data of individuals can be protected by storing
non-invertible hash of biometric data, so that information
can’t be spoofed.
7) Deploying DNSSEC: The CIDR is the centralized
database where all the sensitive information of residents
of the country is stored. Attackers can easily target UIDAI
servers through DNS hijacking, attempting to trick them
into revealing sensitive information, like fingerprint, face
and voice templates.To prevent such scenarios DNSSEC
(Domain Name System Security Extension) can be de-
ployed at each of domain name infrastructures and on
the DNS servers. In DNS servers the users’ data are
stored in unencrypted form. DNSSEC fixes this problem
of unencrypted data by authenticating the origin of the
data. It help’s DNS resolver to ensure that the received
data is not tampered and is authentic. DNSSEC can be
enabled using Cloudfare.
8) Masking: Memory cache at UIDAI servers contains all
the frequently accessed information along with the key
used for encrypting these sensitive data. A cache side-
channel attack enables an attacker to recover the secret
key depending on the accesses made by the user, thus
deducing the encryption key used for securing the user’s
data. This method is invisible to user as it doesn’t
affect the ongoing cryptographic operations in aadhaar
enrollment. Masking can be used as countermeasure
to deal with all sort of side-channel attacks. It avoids
manipulation of sensitive data (assume x here) directly
by an attacker, rather manipulating a sharing of it. If
x1, x2, x3, x4, ......xn
are n number of shares a user data can have, then
x = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ ......⊕ xn
In order to get the information, an attacker has to recover
all the shares value to get the information about an
aadhaar card holder.
VI. AADHAAR-ENABLED FUTURE APPLICATIONS
There are few major areas which need technology-fuelled
structural reforms in our government, our business and our
society at large.
1) Election: In order to eradicate voter fraud, a scheme to
link voter ID with Aadhaar was launched in March 2015,
since a person with registered biometric details can’t vote
again. Meshing Aadhaar with voter ID can speed up our
sluggish voter enrollment process, only when the voting
system becomes electronic. Once the Aadhaar linkage is
in place, smartphone applications will allow every aspect
of voting process- voter registration, address changes,
polling booth information, even casting one’s ballot- to
be available to us on our smartphones.
This national ID program can be leveraged to allow
citizens to vote using mobile phones along with a choice
of polling stations. Instead of being restricted to vote at
assigned poll booth, we must be able to cast our vote
instantly at any polling station in any part of country
using our voter ID linked with Aadhaar, obtained and
verified through cloud.
It can serve as tagging device for new voters to be
enrolled. The Aadhaar holders turning eighteen in a given
year can be made eligible to vote, since the Aadhaar
numbers are issued birth on wards, the system can
automatically flag them.
2) Healthcare: Telemedicine facilities across hospital chains
has served as the first point of contact for patients,
allowing doctors to directly interact with and diagnose
patients sitting thousands of kilometers away. But, it is
impossible to track any patient progression through the
existing medical system as medical service providers have
their on internal data storage systems, which operates
independently of each other.
EMRS (Electronic medical record system) can be used
as low cost and efficient patient management system,
where multiple technology service providers will abide
by set of interoperability guidelines, allowing users of
platforms to pick vendors of their choice, as well making
it easy to move from one service provider to another. The
Aadhaar number will serve as ”natural patient identifier”
in such systems. The Aadhaar backed EMRS will be a
treasure trove of a ’big data’ that can be mined using
analytics to identify public health trends, collect statistical
data, perform disease surveillance and detect epidemic
outbreaks.
But building an EMRS is cumbersome as it requires
creation of new regulatory and legislation bodies, perhaps
a new National Information Utility (NIU). Instead we
can imagine a platform - National Health Information
network (NHIN), that will act as central repository for
all health data in the country. An asynchronous design
which will allow enrollment of every single participant
prior to the launch of NHIN. The government can use
Aadhaar-linked NHIN to make health-related payments
for individual in the similar way Aadhaar-linked bank
accounts are used to outlay government payments.
3) Education: The RTE Act mandates that 25 percent of
the total enrollment capacity should be set aside for eco-
nomically deprived students, and free education should be
given to such students up to elementary level. Some part
of funding can be utilized to create ”school vouchers”
that can be accessible to deprived students to pay their
education fees at the school of their on own choice.
Aadhaar can be used in creation of a central registry and
voucher-issuance platform for schools and students. Once
student will register in system using Aadhaar, vouchers
can be issued against the Aadhaar number of the students,
and parent can use these vouchers to enroll their child at
a school of their choice.
The Entrance examination fraud is another area of educa-
tion sector where we need Aadhaar. For instance ”engine-
and-bogey” scam where the good student is asked to
sit in the centre (engine) and other students will sit on
either side (bogey) to copy in the exam. Such frauds
can be eradicated using Aadhaar, if the students will
be authenticated using Aadhaar before they enter the
examination hall and seats will be allocated randomly
once they enters the examination hall.
Another immediate application of Aadhaar is cracking
fake resumes. The Digital locker initiative is encouraged
by our government to de-materialize our educational de-
grees and skill certificates. Once combined with Aadhaar-
based identification, person’s education qualification is
assured, thus ”trust between employer and job seeker is
established”. The friction generated by the urge to authen-
ticate transcript is eliminated, as no longer any individual
have to get their transcripts attested and notarized.
4) Electronic Toll: Manual toll collection system augment
traffic congestion, wastes fuel and doesn’t serve the
purpose for building a modern and high speed road
network. In order to allow seamless flow of traffic during
peak hours, electronic toll collection system could be
implemented across the country. FASTag is a device that
can be used to carry out cashless payments through a
prepaid account linked to it at toll plaza - the equivalent
of aadhaar for vehicles.
This RFID(Radio Frequency Identification) enable toll
collection system is equivalent to telecom prepaid model.
Tags distribution, the user registration, and the real-time
transactions are three foundation of such toll systems.
FASTag are low maintenance since vehicle owner needs
the tags to be fixed to their windscreen only once, without
worrying about the tag charging or battery changing
overhead. The tags have installed antennas and circuit
chip which is linked to their prepaid account, allowing
transceivers installed at toll plaza to scan the QR code
and the tag identification number, following which the
funds will be debited from the account and the tag is
topped up. Also, the SMS with the transaction details is
sent to the tag owner. The transaction is also recorded in
CES(Central Electronic Toll System) connecting all the
participants including radio tag seller, user adding funds
to prepaid tag and the toll manager.
Initially the toll collection using FASTags was around
20-22 percent. After mandating it went up to 60 percent.
We are still far from our target of achieving 100 percent
implementation. It could be realized with the help of
proper analytics that can automate the collected data on
real time basis, thus helping us to achieve the targeted
financial returns, analyzing origin destination and assess-
ing highway utilisation levels for different categories of
vehicles.
5) Energy and Power Consumption: Our energy economy
largely depends on traditional mode of power generation
like coal, gas and to some extent nuclear power plants.
Today’s grid is one-way street that allows flow of elec-
tricity and information from power plant to consumer.
They are incapable of handling supply complexities and
inefficient in reversing the energy flow. In order to change
the energy landscape of our country, we need two-way
channels which allow integration of renewable source
of energy into system and provide more information
to consumers about their usage while monitoring their
networks.
The Aadhaar linked power plant projects can be used to
bring India’s vast unmetered population on board as well
help us to monitor the electricity load haul by each and
every transformer, thus preventing the fraud. Smart grid
can be one such application that uses an early warning
system to reduce the down time by distributing the load
TABLE IV
CURRENT UPDATES
Date News
Dec 18, 2018, Aadhaar no longer mandatory for phones, banking as center proves changes to Law.
Dec 6, 2018, All Aadhaar users may soon be able to opt-out, get their data deleted from UIDAI Servers.
Nov 4, 2018, Aadhaar Authentication data cannot be stored for more than six months, and the court directed the government not to
issue Aadhaar to illegal immigrants.
Sept 28, 2018, Supreme Court released a list of services where Aadhaar is not required.
Jan 11, 2019, UIDAI introduces new two-layer security. UIDAI announced: Virtual Authentication through a 16-digit virtual identity
number and limited the access available to a service provider. Also, UIDAI will provide ”Unique Tokens” to ensure the
uniqueness of beneficiaries.
Feb 19, 2019, Aadhaar leaks again: Indane Gas website, app leak data of 6.7 million subscribers
March 1, 2019, Cabinet approves Ordinance for voluntary use of Aadhaar for bank accounts, sim cards, etc.
May 8, 2019, DHFL Gets National Housing Banks Nod to Sell Stake in Aadhaar Housing Finance.
May 24, 2019, You can use VID in place of Aadhaar Card number for authentication and availing e-KYC services. VID is essential for
services like checking Aadhaar Card biometrics details, downloading Masked Aadhaar Card, lock, and unlock Aadhaar
Card.
May 29, 2019, Banks Can Use Aadhaar for KYC With Customer’s Consent: RBI.
June 12, 2019, Cabinet Clears Bill Allowing Voluntary Use of Aadhaar as Proof for Opening Bank Accounts, Buying Phone Connections
September 19, 2019, Aadhaar card holders doesn’t need to submit any documents to update their details of email ID, mobile number, photograph,
biometrics and gender on Aadhaar, only need to visit nearby Aadhaar Kendra.
October 28, 2019, UIDAI launched Aadhaar chat bot to address the Aadhaar related grievances of users.
November 20, 2019, AAP government plea High Court that Aadhaar should be optional, not mandatory for property registration and land
mutation under the law.
December 3, 2019, mAadhaar app new version launched allowing users to store soft copy of their Aadhaar in their smartphone.
December 30, 2019, The Ministry of Finance extended the PAN-Aadhaar linking to 31 March, 2020 for taxpayers.
January 1, 2020, Around 28 Aadhaar Seva Kendras (ASK) was opened by UIDAI to support 114 standalone enrolments and update centers
across the country.
January 24, 2020, The Union Law Ministry approved Aadhaar card and Voter ID linking process.
February 3, 2020, UIDAI permits Aadhaar card holders to update their demographic and biometric details free of cost. However, other service
updates requires a minimal charge of 50 rupees.
May 11, 2020, Food Ministry extended the deadline of seeding Aadhaar with all the ration card/beneficiaries up to September 30, 2020.
evenly to the other transformers, when the load on a
particular transformer is high. The identity verification
could help the government to track the power generation
and consumption pattern of power producers. Thus,smart
grids can be used to meet the demand and supply of
consumers with much greater accuracy in real time.
6) Judicial System: Our India’s judicial system lacks trans-
parency, providing minimal information and less control
over the progress of proceedings in the court. The routine
tasks like documents generation, evidence collection and
scheduling trials doesn’t need a judge’s intervention.
Many technology-based judicial reforms have already
been proposed to address these activities, but it didn’t
moved beyond planning stage. A new type of institution is
needed that provide us with a centralized and technology-
driven court operation platform.
National Judicial Network(NJN) can be one such insti-
tutional model to build and oversee such a platform, an
entity delivering paperless justice. With Aadhaar and e-
KYC we can digitize the documents and electronically tag
the evidences to allow easy movement between courts.
The documents and evidences can easily be uploaded
in such a searchable system, allowing for better case
tracking and performance management. The centralized
platform will allow public to analyze some of the avail-
able data and stakeholders to enrol at their own pace,
thus weeding out paper-based system and strengthening
paperless judicial system.
VII. LATEST UPDATES ON AADHAAR
The above Table IV shows some latest news releases (2018-
19) about Aadhaar gathered from the several sources [16].
VIII. CONCLUSION
Security and privacy are the main concern of Aadhaar
as it is now used in many government applications and
Aadhaar enabled transactions. We have gathered some breach
incidences related to Aadhaar from 2011 to present from
the online available public sources. We have classified each
incident into a type of breach and also mentioned possible
security measures for each. Indias Aadhaar project has more
uses and is getting more secured with every new version. So,
we have compared the four latest versions of Aadhaar and
presented them in a tabular form II.
According to our findings, Third-party leakages and identity
theft are the most common breaches that happened so far. The
Aadhaar system itself is secure, but the third party websites
of govt. Departments that are using the Aadhaar data or
authentication service are not adequately secured. There is a
strong need to have a proper security assessment of every
govt website before its launch. Implementation of SSL,
Proper access control, Regular security assessment, Detect
and response mechanism, etc. is a must before using any
Aadhaar related data. Security should be maintained on both
the client-side and server-side to secure the database. The
CIDR system has been established by taking all the possible
security measures; the intermediate agencies and registrars
which capture and store the same data can become a weak link
to be exploited. The most important measure is to maintain
a proper access control mechanism with the least privilege
whenever some organization uses Aadhaar data. UIDAI has
introduced new two-layer security due to widespread concern
over security breaches in Aadhaar. To eliminate data misuse,
UIDAI has also introduced virtual IDs [21]. Instead of sharing
the Aadhaar number, Virtual IDs can be used for verification
with no fear of information leakage since a user can generate
a VID and use it for a single purpose and can change it
every time, making it impossible to trace one’s identity or
real Aadhaar information. Further to enhance the security of
Aadhaar, the experts have come up with the idea of Aadhaar
Coins- Indias own Cryptocurrency to make Aadhaar secure on
which we may work in the future.
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